"We think they are days from failure. They think it is a temporary problem. This disconnect is dangerous."
Tuesday, March 5, 2024
Daily Economic Update: March 5, 2024
Monday, March 4, 2024
Daily Economic Update: March 4, 2024
"At no time in the past few years has monetary policy been “tight”. Indeed it’s been generally expansionary, which is why NGDP growth remains excessive."
Friday, March 1, 2024
Daily Economic Update: March 1, 2024
"..the failure to investigate, after all, everyone was happy. The factories here and there in various cities that turned out the pieces [shitcoins], they made their profits. The wholesalers passed them on, and the dealers displayed and advertised them [all the new ETF players]. The collectors shelled out their money and carried their purchases [virtual wallets] happily home to impress their associates, friends, and mistresses [ex. Crypto Bros and Have Fun Staying Poor]."
"...it was fine until questioned. Nobody was hurt--until the day of reckoning. And then everyone, equally, would be ruined [especially Michael Saylor]. But meanwhile no one talked about it [about how they still can't explain a legitimate use for the coins]...they shut their mind to what they made, kept their attention on mere technical problems [the halving and whatnot]."
- Frank Frink in Philip K. Dick's, The Man in the High Castle on Bitcoin (or on forgeries of pre-war artifacts and Gresham's Law - bad driving out the good and how normative/accepted fraudulent items became)
- Dalio defines a bubble as having: (a) high prices relative to fundamentals, (b) unsustainable business conditions, (c) hot money - people buying just because something went up (d) broad bullishness, (e) leveraged purchasers (f) speculative betting on the future by businesses via large forward expenditures.
- He decides that Mag-7 is frothy but not bubbly - and states the obvious that if AI doesn't live up to the hype those valuations could face significant correction.
- Of his aforementioned metrics he mentions that he doesn't believe we are in a bubble because current conditions lack: a broad bullish sentiment, purchases financed with high leverage and buyers/businesses with extended forward purchases.
Thursday, February 29, 2024
Daily Economic Update: February 29, 2024
“While the economy has come a long way toward achieving better balance and reaching our 2 percent inflation goal, we are not there yet.”“I am committed to fully restoring price stability in the context of a strong economy and labor market.”“As we navigate the remainder of this journey, I will be focused on the data, the economic outlook, and the risks, in evaluating the appropriate path for monetary policy that best achieves our goals.”
"But as long as stocks and bonds have a negative correlation, we can at last reduce this higher volatility in a mixed stock/bond portfolio. And bonds have a negative correlation with stocks, don’t they? Don’t they? …please tell me that stocks and bonds have a negative correlation in the long run because that is the foundation of stock/bond portfolios recommended by asset managers and banks everywhere.
Since the 1960s, the correlation between stocks and bonds has been either very low or even negative. This is the time when modern portfolio theory was born and when stock/bond portfolios became the workhorse benchmark against which to assess all other investment approaches.
But before the 1960s, the correlation between stocks and bonds was on average 0.5 to 0.6, much higher than any investor today expects it to be going forward. If the correlation between stocks and bonds is that high, the diversification benefits from investing in stocks and bonds are much smaller as these two asset classes increasingly move in lockstep.
Note that even since the 1960s there have been large swings in the 20-year correlation between the two asset classes. Notably, in the 1970s the correlation increased, before falling again in the 1990s.
Concluding that basically the fundamental premise of asset allocations could be questionable:
Depending on the regime you expect and the assumptions on correlation you make, the allocation to stocks and bonds will be very different going forward. In a world of high correlation between stocks and bonds, the allocation to bonds will likely be smaller, unless you also expect the equity risk premium to be smaller (which again depends on your expectations for growth, inflation, etc.). In a world of negative correlation between stocks and bonds, the allocation to bonds will be higher, unless you expect the equity risk premium to be larger.
Klement's writing reminded me of an article that turned into a book by Seb Page of T. Rowe Price called When Diversification Fails. In the article Page cites research showing the following:
Based on a precrisis data sample ending in February 2008, Chua, Kritzman, and Page (2009) documented significant “undesirable correlation asymmetries” for a broad range of asset classes. Not only did correlations increase on the downside, but they also significantly decreased on the upside. This asymmetry is the opposite of what investors want. Indeed, who wants diversification on the upside? Upside unification (or antidiversification) would be preferable.
Page's article focuses mainly on how diversification fails most notably at times when investors need it most, especially during crashes (i.e. "left-tail events"). His article shows that hedge funds and private assets do little to solve the diversification problem. Ultimately the article provides:
Unexpected changes to the discount rate or inflation expectations can push the stock–bond correlation into positive territory—especially when other conditions remain constant.
"In an apocryphal story, a statistician who had his head in the oven and his feet in the freezer exclaimed, “On average, I feel great!” Similarly, as a measure of diversification, the full-sample correlation is an aver-age of extremes. Conditional correlations reveal that during market crises, diversification across risk assets almost completely disappears. Moreover, diversification seems to work remarkably well when investors do not need it—during market rallies. This undesirable asymmetry is pervasive across markets. Our findings are not new, but we proposed a robust approach to measure left- and right-tail correlations, and we documented the extent of the failure of diversification on a large dataset of asset classes and risk factors. The good news is that tail risk– aware analytics, as well as hedging and dynamic strategies, are now widely available to help investors manage the failure of diversification."
Wednesday, February 28, 2024
Daily Economic Update: February 28, 2024
" we would have had high inflation in the US without the Rescue Plan, too, though likely somewhat less....A key lesson from this crisis is that fiscal policy is much more powerful than monetary policy. With great power comes great responsibility. It’s a lesson that macroeconomists must learn and devote more time to the nuts and bolts of fiscal policy, even though it’s inherently more tied to politics than the Fed."
Tuesday, February 27, 2024
Daily Economic Update: February 27, 2024
Monday, February 26, 2024
Daily Economic Update: February 26, 2024
- Buffett opens the letter by basically differentiating investors from speculators (a topic we covered here) whereby he believes in attracting "lifetime" shareholders as opposed to those locking for lottery tickets.
- Buffett also takes a jab at so called economic experts in the following lines (discussing his sister Bertie as a typical investor): "She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location. (again a topic we covered here).
- Buffett never misses a chance to bemoan accounting standards, "So sanctified, this worse-than-useless "net income" figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties have done their job - and legally, they have." Lamenting the mark-to-market accounting requirements impact on Berkshire's GAAP earnings.
- Buffett remains optimistic about the power of investing in U.S. based equities and the patient approach to investing, avoiding the noise. (we talked about optimism here and noise here)
- Buffett describes his continued investment philosophy in terms of owning businesses with strong fundamentals that can deploy additional capital at high rates of return in the future, he pulls no punches that he can't predict the winners and losers, but he hopes he can select a few of these business that are run by "able and trustworthy" managers. Later in the letter he points to Coke and Amex as two such companies where patience has paid and how these two wonderful decisions can outweigh the many other mediocre decisions Berkshire has made over the years.
- Buffett states his realization that the size of Berkshire today makes it nearly impossible to double the net worth of the company in the near future stating "There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire...outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates..."
- Buffett believes "Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American Corporation, and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond "slightly better," though, is wishful thinking. (Buffett is known to recommend passive index investing as being an acceptable strategy for most investors).
- Buffett lays out two investing maxims: (1) Wall Street will market whatever foolishness that can be marketed and will do so vigorously - they want activity (2) "Never risk permanent loss of capital" - you will be rewarded if you make a couple of good decisions during your lifetime and avoid serious mistakes. Or to quote Munger: "Never interrupt compounding unnecessarily". (In my opinion both of these maxims are clearly drawn from his mentor Benjamin Graham, you can see the groundwork laid in these Graham quotes: (a) "Nearly everyone interested in common stocks wants to be told be someone else what he thinks the market is going to do. The demand being there, it must be supplied." and (b) "In the old legend the wise men finally boiled down the history mortal affairs into a single phrase, "This too will pass". Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, MARGIN OF SAFETY"
- Buffett as usual is very patriotic throughout his letter. He refers to the things like the "American tailwind", Berkshire's "allegiance..to our country", and Berkshire's goal to be "an asset to the country - and to help extinguish the financial fire [referring to any situation where the U.S. hits a financial disaster]". Buffett also discusses the increased ownership stake in Occidental Petroleum, his ownership of railroads and energy assets all in patriotic terms.
- Buffett describes Berkshire as having "extreme fiscal conservatism" as a corporate pledge, holding a sizeable cash and T-Bill position and always being prepared for a period of economic paralysis while also never wanting to inflict permanent damage on any of their investors. (I feel like you can see how engrained Ben Graham's margin of safety concept is in his thinking - always having a buffer that allows you to render an accurate forecast of the future as unnecessary.)
- Buffett concludes the letter, where he started with reference to his sister Bertie, imparting this piece of advice as it relates to the patient approach to investing: "in 1980...Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich..." "Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha"
Today: New Home Sales, Treasury Auctions 2Y and 5Y notes
Friday, February 23, 2024
Daily Economic Update: February 23, 2024
"The box spread is really a spread of two spreads—constructed by buyinga bull call spread and selling a bull put spread. The pair of option strikeprices for the put and call spreads are the same, with X2 greater than X1.The box spread can also be thought of as two put–call parity pairs, onelong and the other short.The payoff profile for the box spread, shown in Figure E.6, is a constant,X2 – X1, the same no matter what happens to the security price.Because the payoff is constant, the four options should be priced to givea net payoff equal to the riskless interest rate by arbitrage"
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