Friday, August 21, 2026

Edward Quince’s Wisdom Bites: Shoulda Been A Psych Major

Legendary investor Bill Miller argued that there are three competitive advantages in investing: 1) information - knowing something meaningful that no one else knows, 2) analytical - you’re better at Excel (or telling Claude how to do Excel) or making better decisions after your Excel analysis or 3) psychological - you’re somewhere better at controlling your behavior.


Personally, I’m never winning at any of these 3, but if I had to choose one of these competitive vectors where I think I can potentially be better than average, it’s the psychological one. 


It’s not lost on the investing greats that psychological mistakes in investing can be costly.  The late Charlie Munger gave a speech titled “Psychology of Human Mis-judgement” where he listed 24 such misjudgments.  You can find the speech on your own, it’s worth a read.


Today, there is one area that feels ripe with the potential for value-destroying misjudgment, and that’s in the realm of “social contagion”.


Author Luke Burgis wasn’t writing about investing when he penned his recent work The One and The Ninety-Nine. He was writing about 'mimetic desire' and social contagion, forces that cause us to lose our ability to think objectively, becoming trapped in cycles of unconscious imitation and dopamine-driven culture.

Much of what Burgis wrote is deeply relevant to investing, insofar as you believe psychological factors can be a competitive differentiator both for investors themselves and for businesses.


I've found that the market operates as a massive amplification machine for social contagion. Most participants look to their peers to determine what is valuable, at times creating speculative bubbles. Burgis's concept of the "Solid Self" explains the rare investor who can stand alone against this pressure. This individual maintains a firm grasp on their core purpose, ignoring the frantic herd. The "pseudo-self," conversely, remains highly vulnerable to the daily price fluctuations of Mr. Market. Because the pseudo-self is constructed from the borrowed opinions of others, it shifts constantly to align with the consensus. It checks its screens constantly, chasing the latest popular trend.


In my last post, I further discussed the business model of ‘scale economics shared’ found in Costco and Amazon. At a deeper level, these types of businesses believe in integrity over achievement indicators. They resist the pressure of corporate social contagion. Wall Street routinely demands that businesses maximize short-term profits. Analysts scream that a company should raise prices to capture margin immediately. It seems to me that it is possible that many corporate executives operate from a "pseudo-self" that quickly caves to this institutional consensus to avoid looking conventionally wrong.


A "Solid Self" business operates under a completely different logic. Jim Sinegal and Jeff Bezos built their organizations around an unwavering dedication to the customer. They voluntarily capped their gross margins, passing all scale-driven cost savings back to their customer base. This deliberate restraint is what Nick Sleep called an "anti-locker room" mentality. By refusing to join the competitive point-scoring of their peers, they built a compounding machine that defies traditional mean reversion. I suspect this level of corporate delayed gratification is only possible when a firm is anchored by an unassailable internal character. Such companies are willing to look highly inefficient to first-level thinkers because they are playing a much longer game.


To survive as an investor, you must seek out these rare, non-conforming enterprises. It is easy to buy index funds and accept average results. Escaping the crowd, however, requires you to back leaders who can stand alone like the "One" against the "Ninety-Nine." Your psychological edge comes from aligning your capital with businesses that possess this exact structural integrity. The next time a stock in your portfolio is penalized by the market for choosing customer trust over immediate profits, don't panic. Check the structural plumbing of the business and have the patience to sit on your assets.


XTOD: "The big money is not in the buying or the selling, but in the waiting." — Charlie Munger

 

Thursday, August 20, 2026

Edward Quince's Wisdom Bites: The Nomad of 2004 Becomes Incorruptible

 The mood of the markets as captured by Investor’s Business Daily:

“The Fed tightens, stocks go up.

The dollar falls, stocks go up.

Oil soars, stocks go up.

Retail sales wobble, stocks go up.

Is this a great country or what?


Stop me if the sentiment above sounds familiar.


That was the mood as of December 2004 from the seat of Nick Sleep and Qais Zakaria as they reported to their investors in their Nomad Investment Partnership.


It had been another good year, the fourth straight for these so-called “value investors”. 

They sat there realizing that the higher prices for stocks across various opportunity sets posed the potential to be a headwind for returns going forward.


Over the past few weeks I wrote a series of posts titled “Are You Intelligent”, covering the book The Intelligent Investor, widely regarded as the seminal work of Benjamin Graham.


We already know that Graham’s work influenced Buffett and today we’ll see how this work influenced some of the greatest investors of the 2000s, Sleep and Zakaria.


In doing so we’ll cover one of the greatest business secrets ever shared, one that has taken on various names and that once you grasp it, you see it shows up in many places.


But first, Sleep and Zakaria needed to dispel a little myth. Value and Growth investing are not two separate disciplines.  Wait?  Tell that to the teams managing separate strategies on these dimensions at the leading investment managers.


Here’s what Nomad had to say: “We won’t end the debate here but, so that we all understand, our definition is that a business is worth the free cash flow that it can be expected to generate between now and judgment day, discounted back at a reasonable rate. Period. Growth is therefore inherently part of the value judgment, not a separate discipline. “


We’ve seen this thinking before - go back to our discussion on Chapter 11 of The Intelligent Investor - but when you read it, it’s hard to argue against the logic.  To the Nomad team the reason the distinction between value and growth even gets attention is heuristics and marketing.  It’s just easier to talk about a few summary ratios, label them and move on.  But easier doesn’t make things true.


Their letter discusses this value v. growth topic largely because simple categorizations can lead to grave investment mistakes. What are those potentially grave mistakes: 1) Not seeing success and 2) Not selling simply because the categorization in the media changed.


The root of these two mistakes is a failure to dig “down to the underlying reality of the company, the engine of its success.  That is, one must see an investment not as a static balance sheet but as an evolving, compounding machine.”  Like Graham and Buffett they learned to think about Business Values as opposed to Stock Prices.  They understood the lesson on Mr. Market.


And now we learn their secret, what they believe is a vital attribute to finding these “compounding machines”.


The Secret: Scale Efficiencies Shared (or Scale Economics Shared)

Most of us would not believe that capping a margin over cost is likely the best way to generate shareholder value.  It seems to fly in the face of everything we think we know. If a business knows it can charge a customer more without losing that sale, why shouldn’t they? 


The answer is simple, if done correctly, as your business scales, costs drop, and instead of pocketing higher margins, you pass the cost savings back to your customers. Those customers in turn bring you even more of their business, which reinforces your ability to scale, creating a positive flywheel effect that extends the probability of continued success of the franchise.


Costco’s business model with gross margins capped is the classic example of this phenomenon and the one cited by Sleep and Zakaria.  A model they saw employed in other businesses as well.


Costco is also the example held up more recently by author Eric Reis in his book: Incorruptible, writing about why good companies go bad and great companies stay great.  Reis uses it to discuss the idea of a “harder is easier” mission, a fundamental means of contributing to human flourishing, a methodology where companies make more money by actually accomplishing more of their mission.  For Reis the “easy” path is one of a business extracting more margin at the altar of short-term profits, one that potentially erodes customer loyalty and trust.  The “hard” path is honoring and protecting your commitments.  


The paradox is the “harder” way, the one that protects and transmits the company's ethos into fulfilling its mission is ultimately “easier” because customer trust becomes the only engine that needs to be solved for, eliminating the need to attempt to cater to every short-term extractive practice.  Want to avoid internal battles, the need for constant reinvention, chasing quarterly-earnings?  Choose “hard”, because those things are actually the hard things.  Acting in accordance with your mission should be “easy”.


This is the MOAT that Sleep and Zakaria saw, it is a compounding, virtuous cycle of customer reciprocation fueled by sharing scale-driven savings. A practice that protects the company's core mission where trustworthiness becomes the source of long-term value.


In 2026’s Incorruptible Reis is writing about all of the forces that act upon companies causing them to lose what should be their moats. The way that success itself acts upon a company, not just in the sense of an invitation for competition, but also in the way it invites pressure from extractive short-term forces.  Why do some companies cave and others bend the world to their mission?  Reis provides his list of answers and choosing this “harder” path is one of those important characteristics.


Sleep and Zakaria in 2004 were asking the same questions, pondering why some companies persist in the face of competition that should be eroding their business returns. They explain how deferring profits today is done in order to “extend the life of the franchise.” The margin cap, the taking care of everyone in the ecosystem, all actually keeps the competition at bay, fuels growth, all generally building a formidable moat.  The reality is what Reis calls “financial gravity”, the pull of short-term incentives that tend towards structural mediocrity, tends to dominate.  The Nomad team stated: “most companies pursue scale efficiencies, but few share them. It’s the sharing that makes the model so powerful. But in the center of the model is a paradox: the company grows through giving more back….almost no one gives profits back to customers.”


For Sleep and Zakaria the most valuable company in the world would have the following characteristics: 1) a huge marketplace 2) high barriers to entry (offering longevity) and 3) very low levels of capital employed (offering free cash flow).  Companies whose business models embodied ‘scale economics shared’ tend to do well in matching these characteristics.


These companies tend to control their own destinies, which can be a valuable asset.


Just like Reis writes about in his book twenty years later, Sleep and Zakaria are writing about how Wall Street often is quick to misdiagnose the company’s greatest strength as its biggest problem.  How was Costco viewed in 2004?  Well the consensus was “that Costco is a low margin, expensive retailer with a cost problem.”  The Nomad team saw differently, they called it, “a cost disciplined, intellectually honest, high product integrity, perpetual motion machine trading at a discount to value.”


Fast forward to June 30, 2025, the Nomad team continued to expand on their argument that this secret of ‘scale economies shared’ is a powerful misunderstood force.  We already covered why it is so misunderstood, which is generally that wall street largely can’t fathom not trying to make every dollar possible now, even if that means risking the business later.  And that thinking is understandable, we would all agree that the cone of uncertainty increases with time, but one of the powers of the ‘scale economies shared’ model is that it makes the businesses future much more predictable in the future and less risky.  Second, these types of business where the customer saves more than shareholder earns have tremendous moats, again reducing uncertainty arising from competition.


Once the Nomad team saw this model it became a core business model they looked to invest in and one place they saw it when others couldn’t see it was in Amazon.  At the time most of the investing world couldn’t understand how Bezos was blowing all the company’s free cash flow into price givebacks, shipping subsidies, things that were building trust with customers.  Bezos on the other hand was telling those who would listen what the plan was: 

“As our shareholders know, we have made a decision to continuously and significantly lower prices for customers year after year as our efficiency and scale make it possible. This is an example of a very important decision that cannot be made in a math-based way. In fact, when we lower prices, we go against the math that we can do, which always says that the smart move is to raise prices.”  Further providing that “Our judgment is that relentlessly returning efficiency improvements and scale economies to customers in the form of lower prices creates a virtuous cycle that leads over the long-term to a much larger dollar amount of free cash flow, and thereby to a much more valuable Amazon.com “.


The Nomad team understood this secret while the rest of the world didn’t.


Maybe you know what this secret looks like today or maybe you know what other business model is worthy of the investment pedestal that Sleep and Zakaria placed ‘scale economics shared’ on.  I don’t know with certainty what current companies are the next best examples of these concepts, the companies that the market is discounting because the company seems to be ‘irrationally’ treating their customers, employees, suppliers, etc. in a manner that isn’t extracting every last dime from them, but maybe you can find them.

An enduring lesson from the work on Nomad and of Eric Reis is that companies focused on immediate extraction metrics don’t always tend to make the best long-term investments.


Tuesday, August 18, 2026

Edward Quince’s Wisdom Bites: Are You Intelligent? The Summary

Let’s close the book on our multi-part exploration of Jason Zweig's brilliant commentary on Benjamin Graham's The Intelligent Investor.

We live in an era of 0DTE options, meme coins, and breathless AI hype. Modern "finfluencers" and cheerleaders scream that "this time is different" and that old rules should be thrown out like scrap paper. But as we’ve tilled the pages of Graham's work, we find that while the characters on the screen change, the beating human heart remains exactly the same. Greed, fear, and the desperate search for a "sure thing" are undefeated. Here is our final map of the territory—the distilled essence of what it truly means to be an intelligent investor.


1. The Great Divide: Investing vs. Speculating

Most market participants are not investors; they are speculators who refuse to admit they are gambling. Graham’s definition is a strict recipe: an investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.

Speculation becomes mortally dangerous the moment you begin to take it seriously. If you must speculate, put strict limits on the wager and keep it completely separate from your core portfolio. Yet, the modern "financial video game" is designed to exploit our biological instincts, using addictive app designs and social media hype to turn steady ownership into a casino. The speculative public is incorrigible; in financial terms, it cannot count beyond three. It will buy anything, at any price, if there seems to be some "action" in progress, whether it is a JPEG of a monkey or a viral coin.


2. Mr. Market and the Illusion of Control

To navigate this madness, you must understand the Parable of Mr. Market—a manic-depressive gentleman who shows up on your doorstep daily offering to buy your stocks or sell you his at absurd prices. The classic mistake is answering the door just because he knocks. A long-term investor shouldn't care about market prices; Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. You do not have to trade with him just because he constantly begs you to.

Instead of anticipating the market—which is the hallmark of speculation—focus on what you can actually control:

  • Your transaction and brokerage costs
  • Your ownership costs (expense ratios)
  • Your expectations for future returns
  • Your risk, through asset allocation
  • Your tax bill, by avoiding rapid churning

Studies show that portfolio policy and asset allocation can be responsible for up to 90% of the volatility experienced and returns earned. Security selection is completely downstream from this asset allocation decision. The hardest work in investing is doing absolutely nothing, but we suffer from an action bias. When volatility spikes, remember Blaise Pascal's advice: all of human unhappiness comes from one simple thing: not knowing how to remain at rest in a room alone.


3. The Math and the Myth of Security Analysis

When you do venture into selecting individual securities, stop looking for overly complex models. Warren Buffett simplified all security analysis down to Aesop's fable of "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush". To value any asset, you must answer three questions:

  1. How many birds are in the bush?
  2. When will they come out?
  3. What is the risk-free rate?

Ultimately, the absolute most that owners of a business can get out of it in the end is what that business earns over time. But Wall Street loves to build "booby traps" in financial statements. Watch out for "circular financing," where suppliers fund their own buyers to recycle cash flows and fabricate growth. You must do the hard work of digging into the footnotes to understand what a company capitalizes. Finally, adopt the U.S. Air Force rule: "check six". Thinking you are safe is very dangerous; somewhere, there is always a weakness you have to find.


4. The Ultimate Shield: Margin of Safety

In the final chapter, Graham distills the secret of sound investment into three words: "MARGIN OF SAFETY". The margin of safety is, in essence, rendering unnecessary an accurate estimate of the future. If the margin is large, you do not need to predict the future to be protected against the vicissitudes of time.

The primary enemy of the margin of safety is leverage. Levered portfolios face a downside risk to which there is no corresponding upside: the risk of ruin. To survive, you must get through the low points, and the more leverage you carry, the less likely you are to do so. Never forget the six-foot-tall person who drowned crossing the stream that was five feet deep on average. Average conditions don't kill you; the extreme low points do.

Apply this margin of safety to your own mind. Cultivate the intellectual humility to ask: Do I know what I think I know? How do I know what I think I know? What evidence is there that I might be wrong?. Successful professionals succeed because they are disciplined and consistent, refusing to change their approach when it is unfashionable, and paying very little attention to what the market is doing.

As Graham famously concluded: to achieve satisfactory investment results is easier than most people realize; to achieve superior results is harder than it looks.



Monday, August 17, 2026

Edward Quince’s Wisdom Bites: Are You Intelligent? Chapter 20

We've reached the end. It's time we all learn Graham's secret.

The secret to sound investment is “MARGIN OF SAFETY”, so writes Graham in the opening paragraph of chapter 20.  As he says, “it is the thread that runs through all of the preceding discussion of investment policy.”  


So what is “margin of safety”, it is “rendering unnecessary an accurate estimate of the future.  If the margin is a large one, then it is enough to assume that future earnings will not fall below those of the past in order for an investor to feel sufficiently protected against the vicissitudes of time.”  


When considering this concept for common stock investments, Graham spoke of identifying the margin of safety as related to the earnings power of the company relative to the going rate for bonds.  You can probably just call this a sufficient “risk premium”.  Graham would consider the earnings yield (E/P) relative to risk-free rates, and if the earnings yield was 50% or more greater than the risk-free rate, Graham would consider that a very good margin of safety.


Graham goes on to caution that true earnings power typically can only come from observation over many years.  It is a note of caution against “growth stocks” and investors relying on optimistic projections of future earnings as the basis of “earnings power” when considering margin of safety.  He doesn’t dismiss growth stocks outright, simply cautions that some level of conservation is necessary in underwriting their future earnings.


Go all the way back to Chapter 1, remember that Graham defines investing as requiring deliberate protection against serious loss, any operation that fails to include that criteria is “speculation” in Graham’s book, thus Graham states: “we say that to have a true investment there must be present a true margin of safety. And a true margin of safety is one that can be demonstrated by figures, persuasive reasoning, and by a body of actual experience.”


Enterprising investing, or the business of investing is a tough business, Graham sets a high, business-oriented bar for those who are seeking to truly manage a stock portfolio.


But what about the rest of us, those who don’t want to try to hurdle that bar?  Graham’s advice is simple, stay the path of narrow defensive investment.  “To achieve satisfactory investment results is easier than most people realize; to achieve superior results is harder than it looks.”


Commenting on Commentary on Chapter 20

Zweig opens up his commentary with a simple question: “What is Risk?”  People posit many answers, but Zweig offers up simple advice, that investment risk is the possibility of losing all or most of your money.


Zweig reminds readers that risk is not simply about probabilities, it's equally about consequences.  He cites one of my favorite quotes from Bernstein’s book “Against The Gods”, stating: “In making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, the consequences must dominate the probabilities. We never know the future.”


The central theme of Graham’s teaching here is that investing isn’t just about getting the analysis right, you have to ensure that if you’re wrong you can survive. 


In years of thinking about risk, I think an often overlooked aspect of “risk” is the setting of goals, it’s knowing what you want to achieve.  I feel like this is fundamental to providing context to risk and it seems clear that misspecification of goals is a risk we don’t talk enough about, it is the entire framing for how much return you might need and evaluation of various paths to reach that goal. “Taking a risk on the unknown for its own sake is a bad risk strategy.”


My lay advice: Know your goals, mitigate unwanted risk, prepare and position the best you can for when the unknown or unexpected occurs, because life is uncertain, but remember without risk there is no return.


“If we fail to anticipate the unforeseen or expect the unexpected in a universe of infinite possibilities, we may find ourselves at the mercy of anyone or anything that cannot be programmed, categorized, or easily referenced.”

  • Agent Fox Mulder, The X-Files

 

Friday, August 14, 2026

Edward Quince’s Wisdom Bites: Are You Intelligent? Chapter 19

 As we proceed, Graham turns his attention to the role of shareholders’, specifically that they are owners of the company.  In the role of owner the shareholder should be able to question management decisions and be entitled to their share of earnings through dividends or otherwise. 


In his writing in this chapter, Graham displays some semblance of being an “activist” investor, urging investors to make their presence felt at annual meetings, and a plea that shareholders pay careful attention to the proxy material sent to them.  Graham was not entirely opposed to the idea of an individual shareholder or small group attempting a hostile takeover of a poorly managed company, believing that “only by the assertion of control by an individual or compact group” could poor management teams be changed.


Much of what Graham wrote in this chapter has been modernized and is largely irrelevant under today’s financial regulations, but Zweig provides some additional insights that remain valid today.


Commenting on Commentary on Chapter 19

Zweig reminds readers that owners of stock are owners of business, yet as Graham bemoaned, they often fail to act that way.  Most shareholders give their wealth away to someone else to manage (i.e. they make the investment)  without validating the stewards (i.e. management) are proper stewards of that wealth, often finding that management has wasted his wealth.


So how can we be more intelligent owners? It starts with two simple questions we can ask about the companies we own: (1) Is the management reasonably efficient (are they running the business profitably given its size and relative to its competitors)? (2) Are the interests of the average outside investor given proper recognition?


And if management isn’t doing a good job, hopefully you have explored whether the company's governance has any mechanism for shareholders to replace them.  In today’s marketplace many prominent companies have divorced economic ownership from control. In Graham’s time the governance model was shareholders elect the board of directors who appoint and replace management.  In today’s environment with many dual-class structures, the founder (often CEO) controls the board of directors and management.


The important takeaway from this is that knowing the governance structure is an important factor to consider before buying a stock and thinking about alignment of interest. Does the founder have substantial wealth at risk, is there any independent oversight, how is succession handled, etc.?   


None of this is to say dual-class structures are bad, let’s be realistic, most shareholders are owners through mutual funds and ETFs and generally feel like they have no practical influence on any individual company, but with any governance structure the goal is to avoid risks that could lead to the inability for your capital to continue to compound.


As for owners getting their fair share of earnings, both Graham and Zweig argue that a management decision to retain earnings rather than pay it out to shareholders isn’t necessarily valuable, with Zweig citing how often early 2000s tech companies argued against paying out their profits whilst ultimately putting that cash to work in unproductive ventures.  The point is you should question whether “management knows better than the shareholders how to use the money”  rather than defaulting to an assumption that “daddy knows best.”  The takeaway is that management should distribute excess capital unless it can demonstrate a compelling reason to retain it.  That compelling reason can be a track record of strong returns on invested capital.


In terms of how to distribute capital, gone are the days of dividends being the primary means of returning capital, now buybacks play a major role in returning value.  Remember however that when a company buys back its shares it is essentially saying they believe that owning their own stock is the best investment available to them at the time and as we’ve discussed when considering any stock purchase, the price matters.


If you want to evaluate management of a company you invested in today, perhaps you can ask one simple question, “If I owned 100% of this business, what would I do with the cash?”  


Remember shareholder returns aren’t solely about what the business earns, but also about what management does with those earnings. Governance sits a level above that and is an important consideration.


Next we’ll move to one of the most important chapters in the entire book, one focused squarely on the concept of “Margin of Safety”. 


“The most dangerous untruths are truths slightly distorted.” 

-G.C. Lichtenberg


Thursday, August 13, 2026

Edward Quince’s Wisdom Bites: Are You Intelligent? Chapter 18

I admit, the first time I read chapter 18 I wasn’t a huge fan.  It is a chapter which Graham selects 8 pairs of companies that appear next to each other on the stock-exchange list in an effort to display “the many varieties of character, financial structure, policies, performance, and vicissitudes of corporate enterprises, and of the investment and speculative attitude found on the financial scene.”  It’s not that the aim of the chapter is not worthwhile, it’s just that for the modern reader sometimes it can be hard to “care” about 16 companies of which only 4 of the original tickers still are around today.  


However, if you follow the stories of these companies over the years subsequent to Graham’s writings you can find many corporate twists of fates and perhaps it is a reminder that a company no longer trading under its own symbol does not mean the company went out of business.


If you want to, you can use these 8 paired companies as a way to evaluate Graham’s investment philosophy.  If you, or your favorite AI, follow the 55 years since Graham reviewed these companies, you will find that: 

  • Graham’s “margin of safety” proved wise

  • Paying a premium for a superior growth company can be dangerous, though if that company truly was superior and your long-term is long enough, it can still be a winner (contrary to Graham’s philosophy).

  • And in general it is complicated to evaluate the Graham’s investing scorecard in hindsight


Rather than me trying to explain the points here, we’ll turn to Zweig, as he is masterful in distilling the lesson embedded in the chapter.


Commenting on Commentary on Chapter 18

The core message that Zweig distills is that there are good companies and bad companies, but there is no such thing as a permanently "good stock."  Stock prices fluctuate, there are times stocks are a bargain and times they are expensive.  Ultimately the relationship between a stock’s price and its underlying business value matters.

“As Graham liked to say, in the short run the market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a weighing machine.


The lesson is that you should know whether you are buying the business or buying a story about the business.  It is the difference between investing and speculating, it is the difference in trying to identify businesses whose value is increasing versus those whose price or social velocity is going up.


What is also interesting here is that while Graham displays that he is a master at identifying and limiting downside risks, his “margin of safety”, there may be a cost to that approach and that comes in the form of occasionally missing out on some companies that are truly great compounders.


Again it is a reminder that while the price you pay for a business definitely matters, the answer is not necessarily that you should buy “cheap companies”.  It is the evolution of Buffett’s cigar butt investing to buying wonderful businesses at reasonable prices.


When you look back at companies over horizons like 25 years or 50 years, you see that a lot can happen, both to the company’s actual business and to its share price. From that lens you can see that a defining characteristic of Graham’s investing is one that you see in various forms from other great investors and that characteristic is survival.  No one is going to be right about every investment and sometimes “right” might not show up in the share price for a long time, but one thing will likely always be true and that is to be wrong in the ways that you can survive.


“The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun. Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new? It hath been already of old time, which was before us.”

  • Ecclesiastes, I: 9-10

 

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

Edward Quince’s Wisdom Bites: Are You Intelligent? Chapter 17

This chapter is really Graham’s attempt to highlight how all those who participate in what we call “Wall Street” can miss seeing things that are “extremes” when it comes to creating negative outcomes for investors.  Graham highlights 4 companies, one that as an example of the system neglecting the “most elementary” warnings of financial weakness, the second an example of careless lending enabling reckless expansion, the third highlighting some accounting chicanery in M&A and the last an example of extremely inflated price of a stock offering which the public still bought.


While the specifics of the examples above are beyond the scope of my import in this series, when discussing the fourth and final example, Graham offers one of my favorite quotes from the book, stating: “The speculative public is incorrigible. In financial terms it cannot count beyond 3. It will buy anything, at any price, if there seems to be some “action” in progress.  It will fall for any company identified with “[fill in your fad of the day]” when the particular fashion is raging.”


If you think we’ve evolved since the 1970s then I’ve got a blog to sell you. Human nature remains undefeated. Humans will buy a jpeg of a monkey, a coin sold based on a viral video, will bet on eight leg parlays, you name something with some “action” and we’ll be there, price and risk be damned.


Commenting on Commentary on Chapter 17

Zweig updates Graham’s four “extremes” with more recent (year 2000’s) corporate examples. Some of the examples may provide us with stories that sound familiar today.  For example, Zweig discusses Lucent Technologies, a stock that went from $51/share to $1.26/share in 2 years time. The point of this example was that all the warning signs were there; they were just ignored. 


One warning sign Zweig highlights is “customer financings” in which Lucent had lent or guaranteed their purchasers financing of purchases of their products. Isn’t this a story we hear with the AI buildout today?  Suppliers funding their own buyers, recycling cash flows, so called “circular financing”.  The story today might be one based more on equity investments and less on debt funding, but the risks are likely very similar.

Another of Zweig’s four examples of extremes is the IPO of eToys in 1999, an IPO that history regards as an example of the tech bubble top.  The story is one of investors buying a narrative where no price was too high.  A narrative that ultimately collapsed when the reality of the company losing nearly $400 million in less than two years time.


Perhaps the lesson is simple, human nature remains undefeated.


“The wisdom god, Woden, went out to the king of the trolls, got him in an armlock, and demanded to know of him how order might triumph over chaos. “Give me your left eye,” said the troll, “and I’ll tell you.” Without hesitation, Woden gave up his left eye. “Now tell me.” The troll said, “The secret is, ‘Watch with both eyes.”

-John Gardner

 

Tuesday, August 11, 2026

Edward Quince’s Wisdom Bites: Are You Intelligent? Chapter 16

 We concluded chapter 15 with some general advice for selecting stocks, but seemingly out of nowhere Graham jumps to a chapter titled ‘Convertible Issues and Warrants’. It is not my place to be Graham’s editor and discuss the merits of the placement of this chapter, but it is likely that after discussing stocks, Graham was turning his attention to these ‘hybrid’ instruments that carried stock exposure.


While my purpose is not to examine these instruments, I will provide a brief overview. Warrants are simply stock options, the right to buy common shares at a stipulated price.  Convertible issues are bonds or preferred shares that offer the investor the “bond like” protection in terms of paying a coupon/dividend, plus the opportunity to participate in the upside of any substantial rise in value of the common shares.


Graham discusses some of the challenges with owning these instruments, the details of which I will skip. With respect to convertibles he summarily concludes: “Our general attitude toward new convertible issues is thus a mistrustful one.”  His starting point for stock option warrants is that they are: “a near fraud, an existing menace, and a potential disaster.” He bemoans the dilution impact of options and their general misunderstanding by issuers and investors alike.


If I were to take one thing from Graham in this chapter, it’s really his skepticism for new financial innovations, especially those created and marketed during bull markets.


How did Zweig decide to tackle this somewhat technical and arcane discussion?

Commenting on Commentary on Chapter 16

Like Graham, Zweig tackles convertible bonds first, describing them as offering less income and more risk than other bonds or a “worst of both worlds” investment, caveating that it really depends on how you are using convertible bonds in your portfolio construction.  His points here really boil down to: 1) understanding that most convertible bonds are more “stock-like” than bond-like and might be “stocks for chickens” and 2) to understand the intricacies of the specific issues you own including things like any call protection and other specific redemption features.


Moving to stock options, Zweig highlights a strategy that is still prevalent today, writing covered calls to generate income.  What is a covered call strategy?  It is when an investor owns shares of an underlying stock and sells a call option which gives someone the right to buy those shares from you at a higher price in the future.  You, the call writer, pocket income in the form of the option premium which could be viewed as an enhancement to your portfolio providing some protection against stock prices falling.  However, if the price of the stock underlying the option increases you have set a maximum return you can earn from that stock as the holder of the call option will buy your stock from you at the now below market price set at the inception of the contract.


Nowadays there are a number of popular covered call ETFs available. Zweig cautions investors against “surrendering most of your upside”.

For me context is key here, if you’re going to use convertibles and options in your investment portfolio it’s really all about knowing what you own in terms of the exposure these products present and why you own them.


It is one, if not the shortest commentary Zweig provides, so we won’t bemoan it.  

Next we turn to a couple of case studies that Graham believed showed different extremes that all investors should be warned about.


“That which thou southwest is not quickened, except it die.”

-1. Corinthians, XV:36


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